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Should We Abandon the Adversarial
Model in Favour of the Inquisitorial
Model in Commissions of Inquiry?
Patrick Robardet*
1. INTRODUCTION
I approach the question I was asked to address today from the perspective
of administrative law with a particular emphasis on related issues of public
administration. In doing so, I bear in mind Professor Arthurs' well known
criticism of common lawyers' attitudes towards public administration.' In a
similar vein of thought, Professor Wesley Pue recently noted:
Such attitudes are part and parcel of the ideology-of law and as such are inculcat-
ed in lawyers as they partake of legal education, read legal scholarship and
practice law. Even where serious efforts are made to escape the bounds of
inherited legal thought, a persistent suspicion of public administration and
* LL.L., LL.M., LL.D., Co-ordinator, Administrative Law Project, Law Reform Commis-
sion of Canada. The author is indebted to Arthur Grant, graduate student of law at the
University of Oattawa and summer intern with the Law Reform Commission of Canada, for
his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
I H. W. Arthurs, "Rethinking Administrative Law: A Slightly Dicey Business" (1979), 17
Osgood Hall Law Journal at 1-2.
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consequently a general preference of "private" rather than "public" ordering
lingers in the juristic mind. 2
As I do not share whole-heartedly the lawyer's inbred suspicion of public
administration, I find it somewhat difficult to support the adversarial model
without a more in-depth analysis of its foundations.3
I must confess a feeling of being somehow uncomfortable with the initial
question itself and the word "inquisitorial". Words can be heavily loaded.
They are not neutral or value-free and embody global representations of
reality with them. If I ignore the insinuations inherent in the word
"inquisitorial", then, frankly, I do not know what is the inquisitorial model.
The question initially posed in this paper is an invitation to define and
"compare the adversarial and the inquisitorial models for commissions of
inquiry. The question, however, is unfortunately complicated by a number of
different, yet related, considerations. First, there is the absence of a common
understanding of what is a commission of inquiry, both formally and function-
ally. Second, there is the issue of whether we can dispense with definitions of
the terms and techniques used in relation to these models and simply content
ourselves with their assumed common notions. One must be aware, however,
that, although there are common notions of the adversarial and the in-
quisitorial models, these notions are probably assumed to be understood more
than they are actually understood. Finally, we must take into account the
value preferences and the images we hold of social processes and institutions
associated with these different models.
2. SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
I will not reflect here on the dichotomies created by the two models or on
the values and attitudes that may have influenced the perception of in-
quisitorial models in the common law tradition. This would be a bit too
"dicey". Rather, I propose to investigate the nature of both the adversarial and
the inquisitorial models. As it happens, the one cannot be defined without
reference to the other.
Let us start with a definition of the inquisitorial model. Sadly, a quick
glance at the dictionaries does not provide much help'. The Oxford Companion
to Law states that
2 W. Wesley Pue, "The Law Reform Commission of Canada and Lawyers' Approaches to
Public Administration - A Review Essay" (1987) 2 CJLS/RCDS at 165.
3 See Raymond A. Belliotti, "Our Adversary System: In Search of a Foundation" (1988) 1
Can. J. of Law and Jurispreudence 19, where he cautions that "rhetoric" in favour of the
adversarial system should not be substituted for a principled foundation at 19: "Rhetoric in
praise of 'our adversary system' flows freely in the prose of many legal insiders. But
unexamined rhetoric, like self-praise, is of itself of little recommendation."
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In all forms [of the inquisitorial system] the judge's investigation is not limited
to the evidence put before him, but he proceeds with an inquiry on his own
initiative. The alternative is the accusatory system.'
Black's Law Dictionary defines the inquisitorial system as distinct from the
adversary system in which "the judge acts as an independent magistrate rather
than prosecutor";5
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte hear-
ing or proceeding. One of which the party seeking relief has given legal notice to
the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.
6
The latter definition could cover the rules of natural justice and the administra-
tive law notion of judicial or quasi-judicial procedure.
According to another definition, an inquisitorial procedure means that
the judge assumes an active role. Bernard Schwartz states that in that model
"the case is primarily developed by the judge - instead of by counsel, who
plays either a greatly subdued role or no role at all". 7 Although he considers
an inquisitorial procedure to be a practical method of dispensing mass justice
and of achieving greater efficiency by eliminating the adversary element.
Schwartz underlines that "to the lawyer, inquisitorial procedure inevitably
appears suspect" 5
Schwartz's definition is supported by the description of judicial review
procedure before French administrative courts as being "inquisitoriale, c'est-
-dire dirigre par le juge" as opposed to the adversary system used before
French civil courts, which is "contradictoire" .9 Brown and Garner note the
French inquisitorial administrative procedure amounts to the court taking
"upon itself the task of finding out the facts, not being content to decide the
4 The Oxford Companion to Law, by David M. Walker, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980),
"Inquisitorial system" at 623.
5 Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed. (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1979) at 49.
6 Ibid.
7 B. Schwartz, Administrative Law, 2d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1984) at 263.
Schwartz says at 261-262 that "The outstanding contrast of inquisitorial procedure as
compared with the adversary type familiar to the common lawyer is the assumption by the
judge of an active role ... The administrative law judge [formerly known, before 1972, as
hearing officer under the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act] has another function which is
usually associated with inquisitorial, rather than adversary, procedure: that of preparing the
case of hearing."
8 Ibid. at 263. In a footnoote, Schwartz explains: "In part, this may be due to its name and
the pejorative character of anything even remotely suggesting the Inquisition".
9 Peirre Fanachi, La justice administrative, Paris, PUF, 1985, Que Sais-je ? No. 1806, at
96-97.
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case on the facts as established by the parties"." This is explained by the na-
ture of judicial review in France. Contrary to the English prespective where
judicial review is considered to be an avenue for obtaining individual redress
and protecting individual rights against encroachments by public authorities,
in France it is viewed as a means to ensure implementation of the public
interest at the initiative of representatives of collective values." But Brown
and Garner also remark that the French procedure is also
[A]dversary. For it is, in French terminology, "contradictoire", a characteristic
common to French civil procedure and denoting that each side must be given an
opportunity of contradicting what the other party has said. One may compare, in
England, the exchange of pleadings before the trial or the general principle that
both sides should be heard.2
Taking the above descriptions into consideration, we are still left, in the
end, with relatively imprecise definitions of the two models. These
ambiguous definitions would have us accept general procedural patterns and
the idea that both models can be defined only in contrast to each other without
definite clarity or precision. If one must consider that the adersarial model is
distinct from the concept of a trial, which is but one of the diverse versions of
the adversarial model, one is compelled to ask whether this model represents
more than simply a paradigm for resolution of issues. Bearing in mind that the
inquisitorial model also has as its objective the resolution of issues, I suggest
that one look for, in addition to criteria supporting classifications and dicho-
tomies between the two procedural regimes, a core of common, unifying
elements.
3. REASON FOR QUESTIONING, OR REJECTING, A DICHOTOMY
BETWEEN THE ADVERSARY AND INQUISITORIAL MODELS
Asking "what do we mean by an inquiry or a commission of inquiry?"
would be a logical first step. The concept of inquiry can have either an ordi-
nary meaning or a formal meaning." According to the former, an inquiry is
10 L. Neville Brown and J. E Garner, French Administrative Law, 2d ed. (London: Butter-
worths, 1973) at 43.
11 This is the view given of judicial review in England by P. P. Craig in his excellent text
Administrative Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1983) at 431, 444-445.
12 Supra, note 10.
13 See: Irvine v. Restrictive Trade Practices Comm. (Can.) [1987] 1 S.C.R. 181, 24 Admin.
L.R. 91, 34 C.C.C. (3d) 481, 15 C.P.R. (3d) 289, 41 D.L.R. (4th) 429, 84 N.R. 33.
Generally, see Law Reform Commission of Canada (1977), Commissions of Inquiry (A
New Act), Working Paper 17 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1978);
Law Reform Commission of Canada (1979), Advisory and Investigatory Commissions, Re-
port 13 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1979).
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the "act or course of action of inquiring . . . the action of seeking. . . truth,
knowledge or information concerning something . . .", without regard to an
organization, or process or procedure or rules for the guidance of the per-
son(s) making the inquiry.'4 In the 1987 Irvine case, on the other hand, the
Supreme Court of Canada used the notion of "an inquiry in the formal sense"
in the context of ascertaining whether a process is functionally limited or
whether preliminary requirements, such as a legal duty of disclosing grounds
for commencing an inquiry, are imposed. The notion of formal inquiry, there-
fore, can be used to include a legally structured process.
Similarily, whether the inquiry is public and comes within the terms of
the federal Inquiries Act, 5 as opposed to an investigative inquiry held in
private, can influence perceptions as to what sort of process of inquiry will be
employed. A public inquiry will be thought of as being more formal and legal
in nature than an informal and private investigative inquiry. This is not due to
the formalities that can be implied, but to the consequences generally asso-
ciated with public inquiries, that is, prejudice, prosecution or deprivation.' 6
Clearly, therefore, patterns of and attitudes about the process are engaged by
definitions of the types of inquiry.
To avoid the "terminological confusion"'7 caused by the diversity of
inquiry types, we can look for basic functions and purposes to which the
adversarial or the inquisitorial model can be attached.' 8 In the Foreword to its
1977 Working Paper on Commissions of Inquiry, the Law Reform Commis-
sion of Canada (LRCC) states that "government frequently establishes another
type of tribunal: ad hoc commissions to advise on or investigate any number
of matters". 'I Inquiries are said "not to squarely fall within one of the tradi-
tional divisions of government"." This statenient must be qualified because
an inquiry, not necessarily in the formal sense, can be used by any of the three
traditional branches.2' The LRCC paper remarks that "the public inquiry (has
14 Irvine, ibid. at 196 (per Estey J.).
15 R.S.C. 1985, c. I-11.
16 Irvize, supra, note 13 at 231 (per Estey J.).
17 R.A. Macdonald, "The Commission of Inquiry in the Perspective of Administrative Law"
(1980) XVIII Alberta Law Review, at 368.
18 Ibid., at 372-373: "(a) taxonomy which would be of use to lawyers in understanding the
powers and procedures of inquiries, if any may be developed, must ... be based not on
purely formal criteria, but on functional standards".
19 Supra, note 13 at 1.
20 Ibid.
21 See the inquiry in Alberta, before court-appointed inspector William Code on possible
fraud leading to the collapse of two Principal Group Ltd. subsidiaries under the Alberta
Business Corporations Act, S.A. 1981, c. B-15, ss.222-230 as amended (see "Cormie
Lawyer Challenges Scope of Principal Probe" The Globe and Mail (12 Feb. 1988) at B-t).
Under this statutory process, the court-appointed inspectorconducts a Court ofQueen's Bench
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increased) in prominence as an instrument of government" and that "much of
the history of Canada could be interpreted through the work of commissions
of inquiry". 2 If one casts inquiries in this mould of governing instruments,
the tendency would be to classify them as legislative or executive, rather than
judicial, tools. We already know, however, that words such as "judicial" or
"tribunal" sometimes implicitly designate institutions, processes or functions
unrelated to the court system. Hence, we have another reason for looking at
inquiries from beyond the traditional constitutional tripartite division of
powers. In Canada, because it can be said that there is no real separation of
powers, any attempt to clothe inquiries with the fabric of one of the three
branches adds little to our understanding of them.
Regardless of the resolution of the issue raised by the traditional
branches of government, the 1977 LRCC Working Paper dichotomizes
inquiries into two types which themselves lead to additional dichotomies and
characterizations. The first type is the advisory inquiry which addresses itself
to "a broad issue of policy and gather[s] information relevant to that issue".'
The second type is the investigatory inquiry which addresses itself "primarily
to the facts of a particular alleged problem, generally a problem associated
with the functioning of government"4.2 This division is based on which func-
tion, either advising or investigating, predominates rather than exhausts the
nature of an inquiry, but the LRCC also remarks that "[m]any inquiries both
advise and investigate". Why, then, purport to tie procedural dichotomies to
functions if the latter are mixed and ideal types are not possible?
A partial, and implicit, answer lies in the description of the functional
dichotomy just quoted: procedural differentiation would be based on whether
the inquiry in question tends to focus on a specific alleged problem the resolu-
tion of which may adversely affect individuals. Arguably, therefore, whether
the inquiry has to deal with,facts, as opposed to policy, would likely be irrele-
vant, if only because policy-making generally requires collection and analysis
of factual information.
The key criterion for procedural differentiation is identified by the LRCC
as being the nature of the function of investigation:
Finally, it has been observed that all commissions - advisory or investigatory
- are fact-finding commissions, and that the distinction we make is accordingly
inquiry in the stead of the Court judge him(her)self: arguably, this does not apparently
change the nature of the inquiry, which, although quasi judicial, remains an inquiry of the
Court.
22 Working Paper 17, supra, note 13 at 3 and 11.
23 Working Paper 17, supra, note 13 at 5.
24 Working Paper 17, supra, note 13 at 13; Report 13, supra, note 13 at 5.
25 Report 13, supra, note 13 at 5: "But almost every inquiry either primarily advises or
primarily investigates".
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an illusory one. We do not agree. The "facts" sought out by an advisory
commission will be very differrent from the "facts" pursued by an investigatory
commission, which may well be interested in questions of fault and blame.2
[emphasis added]
Hence, while reaffirming that an inquiry is not a trial and that "any
system that might promote confusion of that sort must be avoided",' the
LRCC divorces the two procedural regimes, advisory and investigative, one
from the other. Under the LRCC's view of the matter, where the inquiry is.a
political and policy-oriented process, powers and safeguards of a "judicial"
nature, such as subpoenas and protection of witnesses, are not needed. On the
other hand, where the inquiry is a potentially "quasi-criminal" process,
"[s]tructure and powers must be strictly defined and carefully limited."' This
approach largely follows either the old distinction between law and policy,
with the result that policy-oriented governmental action may lie outside the
reach of law, or the old distinction between "administrative" and "judicial or
quasi-judicial" functions.29 However, the most recent case law confirms our
theory that a determination of process, for a given inquiry ought not to be
settled simply by concluding that the inquiry's function is primarily advisory
in nature. One must go further and consider what happens in reality and ascer-
tain whether a report or recommendation directly affects an individual." The
dominant criterion is the direct consequences of a report rather than the nature
of an inquiry.3
The function of an advisory inquiry does not prevent it from taking an
adversarial character or from having "something like an adjudicatory function
• . . (or) approaching a lis inter parties . . ." because "the repeated advocacy
of a particular point of view by a group or organization" generally can be "of
an adversarial nature".
32
For investigations on the other hand, the LRCC advocated the provision
of the safeguards found in the court process when matters cannot be refered to
the courts themselves. 33 The LRCC regards commissions of inquiry generally
26 Working Paper 17, supra, note 13 at 25.
27 Working Paper 17, supra, note 13 at 40.
28 Working Paper 17, supra, note 13 at 41.
29 R. A. Macdonald, supra, note 17 at 375-376.
30 Irvine v. Restrictive Trade Practices Comm. (Can.), supra, note 13 at 221 (per Estey J.)
citing Re Abel and Advisory Review Bd. (1980), 31 O.R. (2d) 520, 56 C.C.C. (2d) 153,
119 D.L.R. (3d) 101 (C.A.)
31 Ibid. at 224 (per Estey J.).
32 Working Paper 17, supra, note 13 at 27.
33 Working Paper 17, supra, note 13 at 19: "... matters that can be referred to the courts
should be... because the courts offer to those being investigated a full range of safeguards
that are most valuable to a society that respects justice. Second, when a matter falls outside
the scope of our judicial institutions and needs must be referred to an inquiry, then, for the
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"as . . . unusual institutions which may seriously affect individual rights",
and concludes that, "if a governmental power is not necessary and is capable
of abuse, it should not be given".' hence it argues in favour of judicializing
those commission of inquiries which investigate. It assumes, however, that
the selection of a type of process on a functional basis can be more or less
mechanical? 5 Further, instead of associating different procedural models with
the nature and objectives of a given inquiry, it purports to tie certain pre-
fabricated models to certain given types of outcomes. These assumptions
make the LRCC's perspective less meaningful.
Essentially, the LRCC's approach has been to superimpose the adver-
sarial/inquisitorial dichotomy onto the dichotomy between an advisory/
recommendatory inquiry and an investigatory inquiry. Does this approach
adequately address the "procedural implications [resulting] from [a] juridical
characterization" 36 of inquiries?
The functional dichotomy made by the LRCC is evidenced in the current
case law. The distinction between recommendatory and adjudicative
functions recently was used by the court of first instance in the Robinson
case."7 In Robinson, Legg, J. was of the opinion that, in determining the ques-
tion of whether an inquiry is adjudicative or recommedatory in nature, one
must ascertain whether "its report [will] necessarily lead to any subsequent
proceedings against anyone". 8 This is so even if the inquiry report itself does
not include any conclusions respecting civil or criminal culpability or liability.
In the Irvine case, the absence of statutory directions or authorizations to
disclose findings, facts or recommendations to potentially affected parties or
other public officers was considered as virtually conclusive as to these third
parties' rights to such disclosure.3" Nevertheless, Estey, J., who delivered the
judgment for the Court in Irvine, held that the determinant criterion is not
whether the inquiry is conducting fact-finding only or is but only the prelimi-
same reasons of justice, the inquiry must provide at least some safeguards analogous to
those found in the courtroom".
34 Report 13, supra, note 13. at 6, 7.
35 See comments of the New Zealand Public and Administrative Law Reform Committee,
Commissions of Inquiry, 13th Report, (Wellington, N.Z., 1980) in respect of the LRCC
(1977) Working Paper 17 at 19.
36 See R.A. Macdonald, supra, note 17.
37 Robinson v. B.C. [1986] 4 W.W.R. 729, 3 B.C.L.R. (2d) 77, 28 C.C.C. (3d) 489 (S.C.),
affirmed [1987] 3 W.W.R. 362,28 B.C.L.R. (2d) 343, 33 C.C.C. (3d) 90, 36 D.L.R. (4th)
308 (C.A.), appeal on grounds of division of powers argument only dismissed [1987] 2
S.C.R. 591 (sub nom. O'Hara v. B.C.), [1988] 1 W.W.R. 216, 19 B.C.L.R. (2d) 273, 38
C.C.C. (3d) 233, 45 D.L.R. (4th) 527, 80 N.R. 127.
38 Ibid. (B.C.S.C.) at 747, (per Legg J.) Compare with the traditional cases of Saulnier v.
Qudbec Police Commn., [1976] 1 S.C.R. 572, 57 D.L.R. (3d) 545, 6 N.R. 541; and Guay
v. Lafleur, [1965] S.C.R. 12, [1964] C.T.C. 350, 47 D.L.R. (2d) 226, 64 D.T.C. 5218.
39 Supra, note 13 at 208-209.
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nary stage of a more extensive process.' Instead, the notion of an investiga-
tory process, in which the inquiry simply concludes by making non-binding
recommendations, was contrasted with the concept of the making of
"decisions in the sense of a final determination of a right or an interest". 4'
Hence, specific procedural exigencies cannot be decided on the basis of a
characterization of an inquiry limited to a determination of where and when a
decision can be made or actually has been made. The concrete effect of the
inquiry on the rights of the affected parties is the primary consideration in
determining what sort of procedural requirements should be adopted and,
therefore, the procedural model dichotomy is largely made irrelevant.
Another reason for questioning the validity of the dichotomy has to do,
paradoxically, with the very dominance of the adversary model as, what I
would call, the "normal way of doing things legal". I am not referring here to
the court trial model as the ordinary model for legal dispute resolution or
adjudication but rather to the distinction between the existence of adversarial
systems as practically applied in our legal system and "the adversarial system
... [which] is the procedural sub-structure upon which the common law
itself has been built".42 In my opinion, 6 ne is justified in searching for proce-
dural principles extending beyond the adversarial model and all sub-models
founded upon it. The key to this opinion is the position that the adversarial
model is not monolithic, even when used for trials.
For a large percentage of lawyers, especially common lawyers, the
adversarial model conjures up ideas of proceedings analogous to trials which
could be used for deciding almost anything. Let us identify some of this
model's limitations and shortcomings. To do so, we must go beyond the
adversarial model and address the weaknesses of adjudicative theory because
adjudication is the founding structure for the adversarial model. As we know,
whereas a trial is an adjudication and follows the adversarial model, an
adjudication needs not espouse the form of a trial.
Using the term "adjudication" to mean a "trial" causes confusion and
does not accord with the various realities of courts and agencies.43 Firstly,
40 See Irvine, supra, note 13 at 232-235 (per Estey J.).
41 Irvine, supra, note 13 at 205. Estey J. adds: "[The Director] makes recommentations and
allegations and forms opinions for consideration by others and sometimes only gathers facts
and information for consideration by Ministers or by the Commission".
42 Innisfil (Corp. of the Twvp.) v. Vespra (Corp. of the Twp.) [1981] 2 S.C.R. 145 at 166-67,
15 M.P.L.R. 250, 123 D.L.R. (3d) 530, 12 O.M.B.R. 392. Significantly, Estey, J. also
adds: "That is not to say that because our court system is founded upon these institutions
and procedures that administrative tribunals must apply the same techniques."
43 See K.C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, 2d ed. (San Diego: K.C.Davis Pub. Co.,
1978) vol 2 at 313. K.C. Davis refers to the classical definition of an adjudication which he
illustrates by citing Lon Fuller's description of that notion. Fuller underlines three aspects
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adjudication is limited by the factor of polycentricity. This factor would be
typically present where the disposition of any single issue has implications for
the disposition of every other issue forming part of a "web". Polycentricity
essentially is a matter of complexity of patterns of decision, rather than being
a matter of issues or merely a matter of multiplicity of parties."4
When adjudication appears to be unsuited for dealing with such
polycentric questions, two possible reactions, already familiar to the student
of public administration, are worth noting on the part of the "neutral arbiter".
First, he may ignore "judicial proprieties - he 'tries out' various solutions in
posthearing conferences, consults parties not represented at the hearings,
guesses at facts not proved. '45 Second, "instead of accomodating his proce-
dures to the nature of the problem he confronts, he may reformulate the
problem so as to make it amenable to solution through adjudicative proce-
dures". 6 These two reactions indicate that inherent conditions and constraints
of a model, over which a public actor or decision-maker has no control, may
force him to resort to practical procedures aimed at finding a decision or an
outcome, although they may be "improper" under his ideal model. He also
may be forced to manipulate rationality from a substantive point of view.
These two, almost anticipated, alternatives underline the potentially unacco-
modating nature of a particular decisional or procedural model, in this case,
the adjudicative model.
Can we envisage using the adversarial and inquisitorial models as "fall
back on" positions in case of procedural uncertainty or a novel situation?
Decision theory illustrates the usefulness of such "fall back on" standard
processes. For instance, Herbert Simon defines an "unprogrammed decision"
as "a response where the system has no specific procedurres to deal with
situations like the one at hand, but must fall back on whatever general
capactiy it has for intelligence, adaptative, problem-oriented action". '7 By
of adjudication which present distinct qualities: (a) the peculiar form of participation confe-
red upon an affected party is that of presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for a deci-
sion in his favour; (b) a partiy must support his demand by a principle of some kind [a claim
of right]. i.e. the requirement of rationality; and (c). the normal and "natural" resort to
adjudication for deciding claims of right and accusations of fault: L.Fuller, "The Forms and
Limits of Adjudication" 92 Harvard Law Review 353 at 365-370; and see also for a more
recent exposition, A Chayes, "The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation" (1976), 89
Harvard Law Review 1281 at 1282; M.A. Eisenberg, "Participation, Responsiveness and
Consultative Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller" (1978), 92 Harvard Law Review 410 at
411-414, 427. Of course, this basic, and in its classical form, tripartite model cannot be
applied in all situations.
44 L. Fuller, Ibid. at 397.
45 L. Fuller, supra, note 43 at 401.
46 Ibid.
47 Herbert Simon, The Shape ofAutomation for Men and Management, (New York: Harper
and Row, 1965) at 59-60; see generaUy at 58-68.
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contrast, Simon defines a "program" as "a detailed prescription or strategy
that governs the sequence of responses of a system to a complex task environ-
ment".1 A program therefore includes a collection of rules of procedure.
Without deciding the point, one can wonder whether both the adversarial and
inquisitorial models, but especially the adversarial one in our legal culture,
could represent "fall back on" standard processes such as those mentioned by
Herbert Simon for situations where there is no clearly defined procedure to
follow.
Next, I would like to deal with the emergence of a core of legal
principles of procedure. Is administrative or governmental action not now
conditioned by general structural and procedural rules? This question is
warranted by the description found in the Irvine case of the three-stage
evolution of "[tjhhe law in this country relating to the rights of parties to
participate in proceedings outside the traditional court and the modes of such
participation"."
These three stages are: (1) the pre-1975 era; (2) the introduction of the
doctrine of procedural fairness culminating in the 1978 Nicholson decision;
and (3) the era opened with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in
1982.51 Generally, the analysis expounded by the Court stressed that: (1)
classification of types of bodies did create arbitrary distinctions, as between
"adjudicative" and "investigative" processes; and (2) "in the pre-Nicholson
era a number of authorities shifted the emphasis away from a process of
classification of the tribunal in question to the effect of the statutory procedure
on the individual appearing in the administrative process". 2
Characterization, however, has not been totally discarded, because it still
helps to make comparisons based upon broad analogies and historical experi-
ence. In the Irvine decision, for instance, we find a comparison between the
position of an individual at the stage of the initial investigation by the Director
of the Investigation and Research Branch under the former Combines Inves-
tigation Act,53 and that of a person during the police inquiry before a prelimi-
48 Ibid. at 59.
49 Irvine v. Restrictive Trade Practices Comm. (Can.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 181, 24 Admin. L.R.
91, 34 C.C.C. (3d) 481, 15 C.P.R. (3d) 289, 41 D.L.R. (4th) 429, 74 N.R. 33 at S.C.R.
211 (per Estey J.).
50 Nicholson v. Haldimand-Norfolk Reg. Bd. of Police Commers. [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311, 78
C.L.L.C. 14,181, 88 D.L.R. (3d) 671, 23 N.R. 410, mentioned as the second stage in the
development of procedural fairness by Estey, J. in Irvine, supra, note 49 at 211.
51 Irvine, supra, note 49 at 211 (per Estey J.). Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule B of the Canadian Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11.
52 Irvine, supra, note 49 at 216 (per Estey J.).
53 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34. Renamed R.S.C. 1985, c.19 (2nd Supp.), s.19 the Competionion
Act.
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nary hearing. The classification method enables us, without confusing the na-
ture of the different processes, to consider which procedural safeguards are
required by comparing the extent to which rights or interests of individuals
may be affected by a given process.
Returning to natural justice and procedural fairness, it is fair to say that
they do not imply a dichotomy between two mutually exclusive sets of rules:
they collectively form a continuum of formal requirements. Fairness has
become a general minimal requirement for all types of public decisions affect-
ing rights, as well as interests not representing legal rights.,, It now represents
a general principle of law mandating a form of participation which espouses
an "adversarial" dimension between at least two protagonists having different
points of view. The doctrine of procedural fairness enunciated in the 1987
Nicholson case implies a "right to present one's point of view" when some
interest is threatened. This right reflects a relationship which may not be
adversarial as in a trial but which nonetheless posits two opposing sides or
points of view about a matter and is premised on the audi alteram partem rule.
The paradigmatic character of these rules must be emphasized: natural
justice and procedural fairness do not embody specific operational regimes.
Both embody ideals, what we may call a "a different way of governing" or,
perhaps, a degree of "democracy" in the administrative process. Both have a
purposive, or teleological, nature: they serve a function and structure relation-
ships in any process governed by them.
The predominantly functional nature of those rules is underlined by the
fact that they apply, depending on the circumstances, as was stated in the
Irvine case, "[flairness is a flexible concept and its content varies depending
on the nature of the inquiry and the consequences for the individuals
involved".55 Furthermore, their structural nature and purpose mean that only
broad procedural requirements are derived from them. Limited in scope, these
requirements basically amount to timely notice of an action, exchange of
basic facts and allegations and a right to present contrary facts and arguments.
This elementary "right to be heard" does not include, for instance, a right to
obtain reasons for a decision, or a right to counsel or to cross-examine a wit-
ness. Hence, natural justice and procedural fairness give public actors broad
procedural latitude and control over their process.
In the end, the function of both doctrines is to establish and safeguard
general relational and procedural patterns. They do not purport to lay down
practical and detailed rules of procedure or adapt rules of court to activities of
administrators. Thus, despite the "adversarial" dimension which permeates
54 Cardinal v. Kent Institution, [1985] 2S.C.R. 643,[1986] 1 W.W.R. 577,16 Admin. L.R.
233, 69 B.C.L.R. 255, 23 C.C.C. (3d) 118,49 C.R. (3d) 35, 24 D.L.R. (4th) 44, 63 N.R.
353, 63 N.R. 353.
55 Supra, note 49 at 231 (per Estey J.).
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both natural justice and procedural fairness, the similarity between those rela-
tional patterns and court processes, especially the trial model, cannot be
stretched too far. The functional nature of the right to present opposing facts
and arguments, which is underpinned by these notions, relates more to the
preservation of the decency and integrity of the administrative process and the
process of informing decision-making than to a blank cheque for indulging in
trappings and formality.
The Canadina Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not apply to
inquiries, insofar as its provisions are specifically concerned with the criminal
law and process.' This was one of the holdings of the Robinson case.'7
In spite of this, it is worth noting that a result which cannot be reached
through a direct application of a provision of the Charter, can be obtained by
application of the doctrine of procedural fairness. In a recent Qu6bec case
dealing with the alleged right to be heard without undue delay by a commis-
sion of inquiry, a Superior Court judge has stated, obiter, that it could be pos-
sible to prohibit the inquiry on the basis of procedural fairness where the
continuance of the inquiry would be unjust.'
It could also be argued that the Charter offers a framework for an
approach to the procedural question in that it leads to developing the notions
of unifying concepts and continuums of legal requirements.
The trend towards the rejection of the adversarial/inquisitorial dichotomy
is evidenced in the various legislations, be it federal or provincial. A review
of various statutes indicates no radical departure from modeling regimes on
the basis of the "right to defend one's case or point of view", or a right to a
variable degree of participation. The evolution of judicial review also shows
clearly that the tendency is toward a decisive rejection of categories; although
the label quasi still is in usage, its importance has greatly diminished; so has
the distinction between rights and privileges. Further, the placing of proce-
56 I do not consider section 7 of the Charter to be a provision which is exclusively concerned
with the criminal law and process.
57 See Robinson, supra, note 37, (B.C.S.C.) at 747-750 (per Legg J.). The Supreme Court of
Canada, however, expressly noted that when a province sets up such an inquiry, it may not
(1) interfere with federal interests in the enactment of and provision for a uniform
system of criminal justice in the country as embodied in the Criminal Code, and
(2) infringe the rights of Canadian citizens ... [as those are] embodied in the
common law, various acts of both levels of government, including the Canada
Evidence Act R.S.C. 1970, c. E-10 [now R.S.C. 1985, c. C-5], and, more recent-
ly, the Charter. (Supra, note 37 (S.C.C.) at 611-12).
Because the Court in O'Hara addressed only the division of powers question, Estey, J.
made no comment as to the effect of the Charter on the proceedings of the inquiry.
58 See Tougas c. Gosselin, [1987] D.L.Q. 207 (C.S. Qu6.). This case deals with an inquiry
under the Qu6bec Police Act, R.S.Q., c. P-13, commenced after a complaint had been
made to the Qudbec Police Commission against police officers.
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dural requirements on a continuum indicates, without a doubt, that procedural
spectrum, not exemption, is the new appraoch in this area. The distinction
between decision and the absence of decision, or the recommendation/
decision dichotomy, also is linked with the idea that a process can be
approached as being made of different segments or stages linked sequentially
together.
In Irvine, the Court emphasized that, although the statutory structure
under the former Combines Investigation Act was
[C]omplex and extensive, but [it did] not appear to be fully articulated .... The
operations of the Director, the Commission and the three Minister involved
[were] not coordinated in detail or completely. 9
Importantly, however, the Director, as the actual investigator, as not "the
statutory authority which alone [my emphasis] determined the use to be made
of material uncovered in the investigation".' Therefore there is always the
need to identify who is making the determination capable of affecting rights.
In the Irvine case, for example, the Director of the Investigation and Research
Branch had no power to determine whether an offence had been committed.
Since this function was left to the Attorney General of Canada alone, the
function of the Director was qualified as "purely investigatory". 6 But what
then, about situations where a single actor alone cannot be identified as the
real author of an official act or determination?
This question brings the structure of any process into play. Decisions (in
the large, non-legal, sense) or acts can be viewed as courses of action and
defined as a sequence of acts, seen as both units of action and mutually related
means of achieving certain ends.62 This implies that any procedure can, or
must, be looked at as a whole process made of integrated successive steps, not
as a sum of discrete and independent elements. Hence, the distinction
between acts which legally affect individuals and acts which do not is not
clear cut.63 A sequential perspective means that an act or a decision cannot be
viewed as either instantaneous or as the final moment of a process.'
59 Irvine, supra, note 49 at 204 (per Estey J.).
60 Irvine, supra, note 49 at 217.
61 Irvine, supra, note 49 at 232.
62 .M. Meyerson and E. Banfield, Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest (New York: Free
Press, 1955) at 312.
63 See R. D. Howe, "The Applicability of the Rules of Natural Justice to Investigatory
Functions" (1974) 12 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 179.
64 As Simon has noted, common images of decision-makers picture them as
[Men] at the moment of choice, ready to plant his foot on one or another of the routes
that lead from the crossroads. All the images falsify decision by focusing on its final
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Second, the concept of an action as a sequential structure implies that a
type of programming has been used. Contrary to the well-known feedback
mechanism which pervades decision theory generally, the legal view tends to
see a decision as the outcome of a linear process. Admittedly, a linear view of
decision-making facilitates the circumscription of the legal effects of an action
and the manifestation of authority or power; linearity enables one to identify
who is the responsible author of an act. It detracts, however, from the atten-
tion that must be paid to interrelations between actions and actors within
complex organizations.65 In that sense, legal accountability assumes that
decisions are discrete and a process can be controlled at any given single
point, regardless of the feasibility of simple control points. 6 This assumption
is facilitated by notions such as administrative law being a law for the vindi-
cation of private rights through judicial review. Legal linearity, then, means
assuming that an act always has an identifiable author, rather than being
primarily the product of the activity of an organization or the product of a
complex process.
4. SOME REASONS FOR MAINTAINING A DICHOTOMY
BETWEEN THE ADVERSARIAL AND THE INQUISITORIAL
MODELS
At this point of the analysis I suggest that we consider some constraints
on model selection. At the provincial level, while not directly related to the
issue of the choice between the adversarial and inquisitorial models, a distinc-
tion must be made between inquiries where federal criminal procedure will
apply as opposed to other types of inquiries where provincial administrative or
inquiry procedures will be sustained. This distinction is due to a constitutional
question based on sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.67 The
various facets of this constitutional issue were addressed by the Supreme
Court of Canada in the appeal of the Robinson decision."
Because of the division of powers issue, one must determine whether or
not an inquiry is criminal in nature or, in other words, whether or not it is
oriented towards making findings of criminal liability. Hence, categorization
is necessarily part of the discussion. Various tests have been offered in cases
moment. All of them ignore the whole lengthy, complex process of alerting, explor-
ing, and analyzing that precede that final moment. (Simon, supra, note 47 at 53).
The issue just described applies equally to law.
65 Generally, see L. Sfez, Critique de la dicision (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des
Sciences politiques, 1981).
66 See R. Baldwin and K. Hawkins, "Discretionary Justice: Davis Reconsidered", [1984]
Public Law 570 at 582.
67 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
68 Robinson, supra, ndte 37 (S.C.C.).
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such as Di Orio9 and others. In making this determination, the issue can be
formulated in a number of ways, including, for instance:
1. whether the inquiry should be a trial under the Criminal Code, because
it is directed at a particular crime or act that later may be used in a
criminal charge;7 or
2. whether the inquiry is in fact a trial which evaluates both facts and the
application of the law to the facts, as opposed to only a method of deter-
mining and reporting facts;' or
3. whether or not the inquiry's purpose is really to try to punish a police
officer suspected of the commission of a crime in the course of his or her
duties or whether its objective is instead to control and discipline provin-
cial police officers.73
In addition, if an inquiry is civil in nature, one still must ask whether the
judicial trappings traditionally applied in criminal law settings will also apply
to that inquiry. Here, one must engage our accepted notion of justice. Again,
as in the case of inquiries of a more criminal character, the tests to be used
include a determination of the nature of the mandate of the inquiry, or in other
words, whether the inquiring body is in fact a court or the inquiry a trial and
whether there is a party suspected of liability or not.74
From a more practical point of view, if the accused's right to remain
silent, although based in the criminal law, is extended to civil applications,
can we still resort to an inquisitorial model regardless of whether the commis-
sioner can compel attendance? Does not the right to remain silent exclude its
invasion by an inquiry?
A more global question involves the prevalence of form over function.
Historically, in English law, form did precede function. This is illustrated by
the notion of "quasi-judicial" powers and the fact that, traditionally, the
justice of the peace was as much an administrator as a local magistrate. The
1977 LRCC paper postulates the primacy of function over form and suggests,
therefore, that form should follow substance. If one follows the LRCC
approach, one should be able to rationalize and articulate the dichotomy
between the two models with great precision. To do so requires that we
address both negative and positive aspects of the procedural models. We will
commence by looking at some of the negative aspects of the adversarial
69 Di Orio v. Montreal Jail Warden, 11978] 1 S.C.R. 152, 35 C.R.N.S. 57, 8 N.R. 361.
70 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, as amended.
71 See, for example, Nelles v. Grange (1984), 3 O.A.C. 40,42 C.P.C. 109,9 D.L.R. (4th) 79
at 84-85.
72 Irvine, supra, note 49 at 232-235; Re Nelles, ibid.
73 Bisaillon v. Keable, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 60 at 79, 7 C.C.C. (3d) 385, 37 C.R. (3d) 289, 2
D.L.R. (4th) 193, 51 N.R. 81; Robinson, supra, note 37 (S.C.C.) at 607-609.
74 See A.G. (Can.) v. C.N. Transport Ltd., [1983] 2 S.C.R. 206.
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model. It can be argued that inquiries require flexibility, and, therefore, the
adversarial, adjudicative model should be excluded? 5 To what extent, how-
ever, does an inquiry imply a different functional model than other processes?
Can we differrentiate between processes on the basis that different facts are
involved or different types of truth76 are engaged? It is worth noting that the
McRuer Commission in Ontario did argue that different types of analytical
and decisional processes by envisaged and concluded that scientific investiga-
tions would be better suited in many instances than inquiries based on an
adversarial, adjudicative model.' This conclusion rested upon the notion that
the differrent sorts of inquiries are addressing different types of truth. Assum-
ing that the purpose of inquiries is to seek truth, then there is certainly a case
to be made that adjudication, which only seeks to produce outcomes satisfac-
tory to the parties as opposed to seeking "rational" decisions (as this term is
understood in the non-legal disciplines), has a character which is inappro-
priate for most inquiries.
Hence, we are brought back to decision theory. We know that rationality
is bounded and, that in most situations, decision-makers will seek a satisfac-
tory decision or outcome rather than an optimal solution. People do not have
the material, time or vision to operate in the manner postulated by the model
of rationality found in decision theory.78 This is illustrated by the comprehen-
sive, adversarial, adjudicative model which makes unrealistic demands on
decision-makers because they never have a full range of choices or materials
before them.
One important aspect relative to the choice between procedural models is
the fact that processes involve conditions that must be treated as fixed
because, in the context of attempting to achieve a rational decision or choice,
the decision-maker will not or cannot change them.7" Treating those condi-
tions as fixed should help an actor to know what acts or courses of action are
open to him and to recognize other limiting conditions. However, in most
situations, regardless of whether they should decide to change a condition if
empowered to do so, public actors do not have full knowledge of their
options.
It is fascinating that some fixed conditions which limit a public actor's
options reflect values relating to the decision-making process. However,
values are often sacrificed when specific ends are desired. This can be under-
75 See, R.A. Macdonald "The Commission of Inquiry in the Perspective of Administrative
Law" (1980) XVIII Alberta Law Review 366 at 371.
76 By "different types of truth", I mean that not all "truths" are the same for all purposes. For
instance, scientific truth is not the same as religious truth, and legal truth is not the same of
philosophical truth.
77 J. C. McRuer, Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Civil Rights (Toronto:
Queen's Printer, 1968) at 131-32.
78 See P. P Craig, Administrative Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1983) at 231.
79 See M. Meyerson and E. Banfield, supra, note 62 at 316.
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stood through the distinction made by Meyerson and Banfield between active
elements and contextual elements in relation to end reduction or elaboration.80
Active elements represent the features of desired situation that are the focus of
interest, whereas contextual elements represent value conditions to be realized
or respected in the attainment of those active elements. Sometimes, in defin-
ing a goal or objective, active elements cannot be achieved without sacrificing
certain contextual elements. Hence, if contextual elements are valued more
than the active ones, the end may be rejected.
Some value conditions call for proactive measures for their realisation,
and therefore for positive attributed of action, others call for abstention from
violation, and therefore the absence of negative consequences. The priorizing
of values implies choices, active control and balancing or sacrificing of
values. The adjudicative model constitutes a good example of this value
priorization.
Adjudication illustrates the importance of contextual elements. It seeks
justice through a claim of right or an accusation of fault; demands have to be
founded on proof and reasoned arguments and decisions must be reasoned and
principled in order to satisfy the parties. The extent to which this model is
influenced by value conditions, whether realized or respected (i.e., not vio-
lated), is illustrated by the positions and interests of the actors.
First, in the administrative law setting, adjudicative values support main-
ly the protection of individual parties' interests against governmental actions.
Consequently, adjudicative values tend to be treated as conditions that cannot
be violated by public actors or decision-makers, although parties can waive
protections created to safeguard their interests. Positions would change if
legal requirements and values were considered either to support interests
larger than those of individuals or to imply proactive roles for actors and
decision-makers in the structuring of their processes. So far, arguably, pro-
active roles have been more easily supported where decisions or actions
affecting rights are not pursued. Adjudicative values tend to imply a rather
passive role for a neutral arbiter, greater control of process by the parties than
by the third party arbiter and a tactical presentation of the facts by the parties.
This model, however, is only a model, and does not prevail in most situations.
Whether adjudicative values can be sacrificed depends on the nature of
control over a process and the substantive and procedural rationality of that
process. Two such sacrifices have been mentioned above. The "neutral
arbiter" may want to overcome the limiting conditions of the model and
achieve greater substantive rationality by adding his own input to that of the
parties. He may also try to simplify issues to make them amenable to a solu-
80 Meyerson and Banfield, supra, note 62 at 316, view "end reduction and elaboration" as the
establishing of goals or objectives and then the priorizing or "reduction" of them so as to
render the accomplishment of the most important goals possible.
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tion within the structure of the model and achieve a satisfying outcome within
a then acceptable procedure. To effect these "deviations", the arbiter must
have certain powers which will permit him or her to modify the conditions of
the adjudicative model. These powers may relate, for instance, to control over
introduction of facts and arguments. Hence, the issue is who, among the
private parties and the public actors, has the power of sacrificing values.
The adjudicative model does not have severe substantive or procedural,
limiting conditions. This may be because this model includes few principal
ends and contextual elements. Distortions occur, however, when adjudication
is used with different contextual elements and for different purposes. It is not
designed to achieve, or permit the violation of, a broad range of value con-
ditions because it rests essentially upon a tripartite relationship and focuses on
limited private interests and values. Therefore, when polycentricity and value
priorization are involved, the appropriateness of an adversarial, adjudicative
model is called into question. Given that it is a model premised on individu-
alism, adjudication tends to preclude the ordering of ends by the decision-
maker or public actor. Since, in principle, the parties control the process, it is
not incumbent on the decision-maker to make value sacrifices as his or her
primary function. This means, therefore, that where control over process by
the public actor becomes essential, the adjudicative model may be inap-
propriate.
Finally, before one can make meaningful suggestions about procedural
choice in inquiries, the tremendous diversity of inquiries must be strongly
emphasized. The actual diversity of inquiries may pre-empt any systematic
conceptualization of inquiry procedure. There are two reasons for this. First,
the many types of inquiries preclude meaningful classification. Second, too
many features used for taxonomic purposes are not precise enought to
delineate actual significant differences. Therefore, unless one is content with
resorting to intuition to achieve this classification of inquiry procedure, one is
left with the impossibility of systematically categorizing such procedures.
Furthermore, inquiries contend with diverse subject matters and
purposes. For instance, inquiries have been used quite extensively for the
purposes of policy determination, including that of legislative policy. As well,
there has been a recent resurgence of their use in resource management.8' One
of the many salient features of inquiries is that they have been used for three
different types of planning normative, strategic and operational. It is in the
realm of inquiries used for normative planning that the adversarial, adju-
dicative model becomes most inappropriate.
81 See L. Graham Smith, "Mechanism for Public Participation at a Normative Planning Level
in Canada" (1982), VIII Canadian Public Policy 561 at 565, quoting K. M. Lysyk, "Public
Inquiries and the Protection of the Public Interest in Resource Development Projects"
(1978) 3:1 Journal of Natural Resource Management and Interdisciplinary Studies.
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Normative planning can be defined as "a reconsideration of the value
premises underlying decisions", as was illustrated by the Mackenzie Valley
Pipeline Inquiry (the Berger Inquiry), or as "the definition of desired ends and
goals" or the making of "decisions that determine what ought to be done".82 In
such context, inquiries can be compared to such mechanisms as lobbying,
advisory bodies, Green Papers and legislative committees. These types of
inquiries are characterized by their principally advisory/recommendatory na-
ture and their primarily political character. When constituted as public
inquiries, they are used as vehicles for public participation in government, a
process which presents both strengths and weaknesses.
One strength of a public inquiry is its open and democratic character;
however, publicity cannot be said to be a fundamental basic characteristic of
the inquiry process since statutory regimes generally provide for inquiries to
be in camera. Public inquiries are then the exception and not the rule. Indeed,
when there is a public inquiry, publicity may become one of the inquiry's
drawbacks. A high degree of publicity can significantly affect key witnesses'
reputations. 3 A second strength would be that public inquiries exhibit a high
degree of flexibility in their methodology and are conducive to in-depth analy-
sis.' On the negative side, however, two of the weaknesses of public
inquiries can be said to be their ad hoc, adversarial, costly and lengthy nature
and the fact that they often represent a means of political inaction.
Because inquiries are able to perform tasks which are unsuitable for
either the courts or the adjudicative model, there is a case against the judi-
cialization of certain types of inquiries. In any event, some would argue that
the multitude of functions for which inquiries are used puts in question the
appropriateness of the adversarial, adjudicative model for all of them.
Although it can be said that an inquiry "necessitates a major issue of con-
siderable contentiousness for its establishment",5 it does not follow that the
inquiry thereby established must be adversarial and adjudicative. Indeed,
political processes which are often quite adversarial in nature do not neces-
sarily call for adjudication. Furthermore, a given inquiry does not have to
adopt a single procedural model. To this end, observe the Berger Inquiry on
the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline which demonstrated that a mix of hearing
formats can be achieved depending upon the objectives sought. It managed to
reconcile board participatory and informal community hearings of a political
82 These examples are taken from L. Graham Smith, ibid. at 562.
83 Witness the effect of publicity in the Grange Inquiry on the nurse, Susan Nelles: see Re
Nelles, supra, note 70.
84 See L. Graham Smith, supra, note 80 at 564, Table 2: "Alternative Mechanisms for Norma-
tive Participation" which summarizes A. D. Doerr's analysis in her work: The Machinery of
Government (Toronto: Methuen, 1980) at 136-164; the discussion in R. A. Macdonald
supra, note 75 at 370-371.
85 Smith, ibid. at 570.
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nature, with "formal hearings (based on the legal model) for technical debate
and the presentation of development proposals".' Given that an inquiry must
remain flexible as an instrumentality, one must ask which of the two proce-
dural models as adapted would best enable it to achieve its goals.
5. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, the problem is that inquiries have different functions
and goals and are created for numerous and diverse reasons. They can target
the solution of a certain problem or they can facilitate policy outcomes or, in
the opposite direction, they can be used to legitimize inaction on the part of
political decision-makers by burying the issue. To this list of differentiating
factors, we must also add the diversity of the issues undertaken by inquiries,
the diversity of participants and interested parties in inquiry processes, be they
policy-oriented or more focused on particularized facts, and the diversity of
what we may call potential victims of inquiries. For greater complexity, we
should add diversity in the contextual relations between inquiries and
administrative and political processes.
In concluding, I ask, "is there really a case for some kind of differen-
tiation of processes? Should we not call for some kind of a hearing? Should
we not favour a spectrum of procedural requirements rather than a series of
procedural dichotomies?" A core of principles of general application which
transcend the adversarial/inquisitorial dichotomy and which represent a broad
continuum of procedural exigencies may be the only way to achieve a practi-
cal, yet legal and principled, compromise for inquiries, if not for many types
of governmental action.
86 Smith, supra, note 84 at 565.

